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Translation

Clarification of the Army Chief-of-Staff on the Results of the Honourary Military Council and the Plan for Further Action

1. As is known, in furtherance of the Instruction of the President as Supreme Commander of ABRI [the Indonesian Armed Forces], the Army/ABRI Chief-of-Staff established an Honourary Military Council (DKM) to examine the 12 November 1991 Incident more thoroughly.

2. An Honourary Military Council is a normal thing in the life and tradition of the Army/ABRI, which is set up as a temporary body to examine and evaluate something that has been done and/or not done by a person or several officers in relation to their duties and competence and also to call them to account.

3. It was the task of the DKM which was headed by Major-General Faisal Tanjung to undertake a more thorough investigation, study and evaluation of the policy of and steps taken by the local Command in its handling of the 12 November 1991 Incident, in order to discover the truth so as to be able to draw lessons for the guidance of the Army/ABRI.

4. The DKM [*Dewan Kehormatan Militer*] worked from 2 January until 20 February 1992. Its method of work and activities were as follows:

a. Examination of documents (including the advance report of the National Inquiry Commission).
b. Examination and collection of statements.
c. Meetings/interviews of 51 persons.
d. On-field inspection and reconstruction of the incident.
e. Investigation of 6 Investigated Officers [*Perwira Terperiksa*], including the summoning of 18 witnesses.

5. The Investigated Officers were Officers of the Local Command, the former:

a. Udayana Regional Military Commander [Major-General Sintong Panjaitan].
b. The Commander of *Kolakops*, the Operational Command of East Timor [Brigadier-General Rudolf Warouw].
c. The Deputy Commander of East Timor *Kolakops* [Colonel J.P. Sepang].
d. *Kolakops* Assistant for Intelligence [Colonel Gatot Purwanto]
e. The Commander of Section C. [Colonel Binsar Aruan]
f. The Commander of 1627 Military Command/Dili [Lieut.Colonel

Wahyu Hidayat]

[*Note: The original document does not give the names of the officers.*]

6. The DKM completed its task and reported its findings to the Army Chief-of-Staff. The DKM's findings were reported by the Army Chief-of-Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and directly to the President. In broad lines the findings of the DKM are as follows:

a. *Operasi Teritorial* [Territorial Operation] in East Timor, in force as the basic operation since 1989, was aimed in general at improving the welfare of the people, the specific aim being to help and encourage the East Timorese people to adopt a more dynamic attitude and become more productive so that their standard of living could improve.

b. However, in its implementation, it is clear that it was utilised by the GPK [*Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan*, Security Disruptor Gang, the term used officially for the East Timor resistance] to their own advantage, especially in Dili. The persuasive approach adopted by the local Command in fact provided the opportunity for the GPK to foster anti-integration feelings, particularly among the youth in Dili. The persuasive approach based on the theme of "Love" was in fact used as an opportunity for the GPK to enhance its influence and mobilise the masses in furtherance of its political interests. Subsequent developments opened the way for the GPK to make its presence known to the outside world by conducting an escalated series of demonstrations or mass actions starting in 1989, giving expression to overt anti-integration attitudes, even unfurling Fretilin posters and flags, leading eventually to the burning of a motor-bike and attack on officials, and even pulling down the Red-and-White flag. The attitude adopted by the GPK (especially in Dili) was one reason why the emotions of some members of ABRI exploded, besides other factors that were deliberately created by the GPK. It was this uncontrollable explosion of emotions that caused some soldiers to act improperly.

c. It should have been possible to know in advance that the 12 November 1992 Incident would occur because indications and preparations for this were already evident several days beforehand. It is greatly to be regretted that the local Command failed to take the appropriate measures and actions.

7. After carefully examining the findings of the DKM, the Army Chief-of-Staff has taken the following actions:

There are three kinds of mistakes and/or offenses committed by the local Command and by those implementing (the action), in their handling of the 12 November 1991. The following measures have therefore been taken:

First: Because of their mistakes and neglect, the following punitive actions have been taken with regard to the six "Investigated Officers": three Officers "have been dismissed from

military service" and two others "are no longer being given posts within the structure of the Army/ABRI but are still on active service", while one Officer is for the time being not being given a post in the Army structure but is still on active service.

Second: Errors which are the responsibility of Command, namely the Commanders who were in command and who were in control of things on the spot as well as members who committed offenses against military ethics and discipline in the form of actions that were improper, tending towards criminal acts. These errors and/or offenses will henceforth been handled by handing them over to Military Courts in conformity with the procedures in force. The following are being taken to Military Courts: four officers, 3 non-commissioned officers and 1 private.

Third: Errors committed by officers who did not feel called upon to take actions that they should have taken. There are five officers who need to undergo further investigation in order to examine whether it is indeed true that they did not take actions that they should have taken.

8. These are the findings and steps taken by the Army/ABRI in handling the 12 November 1991 incident, which are basically "an internal correction within the body of the Army/ABRI towards actions by its members". These corrections in essence reflect the "sense of responsibility" of the Army/ABRI towards everything that has been done.

[Note: Apart from anything in square brackets, all bracketing and quotation marks follow the original document.]